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1997: How Long Can North Korea Go on Like This?
Aidan Foster-Carter
In commenting on North Korea's prospects for 1997, I feel inclined to be cautious; 
not least because I have been incautious in the past. In my Korea's Coming 
Reunification, published by the Economist Inteligence Unit in 1992,1 wrote: „Korea 
wil be reunified; certainly by 2000; probably by 1995; possibly sooner“ (page 96). 
The fact that I was wrong about the possibly and the probably should, and does, 
make me pause to reflect whether I can stil be so certain about the certainly.
In the same work I also stuck my neck out on the issue of how as wel as when: 
„Hopes .. for a gradual transition .. are in vain: there wil at some point be a System 
colapse in North Korea, as in East Germany“ (ibid.). In subsequent debates in 
Seoul, I may even have coined the word „colapsism“ for this position: not a wish, 
then or now, but an expectation. In the early 1990s this was an unpopulär view in 
South Korea, though it may have more adherents now. But puting aside al 
preconceptions, what are Pyongyang’s prospects in 1997? This short article looks in 
tum at relevant aspects of the north’s polity, economy, and society.
1 Polity
One striking aspect of the North Korean political System is that due process has gone 
by the board since Kim Il-sung died. It is not just that the country has been without 
both a head of state and a party general secretary for more than two years. Other 
institutions too seem to be in limbo. The Supreme People’s Assembly failed to 
assemble in 1995 or 1996, so depriving us of Ms Yun Gi-jong’s usual budget speech. 
The SPA is in any case out of time, since a new election was due in 1995. As for the 
party, not only is it now 16 years since the last ful KWP Congress, but it is not even 
clear that the usual Central Commitee plenary meetings have been held.
This relates to a second aspect. CC plenaries decide job appointments (or 
disappointments), but these too have been in limbo since July 1994. Except in case 
of death (as when Choe Gwang eventualy succeeded O Jin-u as defense minister), 
hardly any of the North Korean elite have lost or gained either jobs or party rank. 
This would be odd in any polity, but especialy in a communist System in the throes 
of both a dificult succession and a generational shift. Even people who are clearly 
either too il to do their jobs or out of favor remain nominaly in post: respective 
examples being prime minister Kang Song-san, and Kim Jong-il’s unloved uncle 
Kim Yong-ju, stil listed (although not often) as both a vice-president and Politbüro 
member. Al this adds to the sense of a polity somehow in abeyance.
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A third oddity is that even the big public displays that used to pass for politics in 
North Korea are now few and far between. Major red-leter days, such as the state 
and party anniversaries in September and October, went almost unmarked last year. 
It is tempting to speculate that under present conditions, particularly after two years 
of flooding and food shortage (more on which below), the regime fears that any mass 
gathering of the populace might backfire. This may also explain the failure of the 
SPA to meet (in case genuine debate might break out, as indeed it ought to), and the 
prolonged postponement of Kim Jong-il’s twin coronations.
But if formal politics is in suspended animation, what of the real thing? There can 
be litle doubt now that sections of the military are in Charge in Pyongyang, at least 
in the sense of having ultimate power of veto. Evidence for this view includes: the 
rise of several vice-marshals in the hierarchy; the way the military virtualy took over 
the KWP’s 50th anniversary in 1995; and above al, the fact that almost al Kim 
Jong-il’s appearances since his father’s death (unlike before) are in military contexts. 
Even last September’s submarine incident, just days after the rather successful Rajin- 
Sonbong investment forum, suggests a spoiling maneuver by the KPA. (I don’t mean 
that they intended to run aground, obviously; but rather perhaps to Sabotage - 
literaly - the already slim prospects of peaceful coexistence, and KEDO in 
particular.)
Hence I believe that Kim Jong-il reigns rather than rules. He is a figurehead, or at 
best an arbiter between reformers and diehards. Ironicaly, much as North Korea 
blathers on about its great and dear leaders, real leadership is one quality palpably 
missing in Pyongyang. With the single important exception of the nuclear issue, none 
of the numerous and urgent policy chalenges are being grasped. This sense of drift 
set in even while Kim Il-sung was alive, but has got much worse (along with the 
Problems) since. Hence, frankly, I neither know nor care whether Kim Jong-il wil at 
last assume formal ofice this year; although if he does, this would imply an increase 
both in his real power and the regime’s confidence. My bet would be that he won’t.
2 Economy
The ungrasped netles just mentioned relate mainly to the economy, whose parlous 
plight is now even admited by North Korean ministers - if only to foreigners. Kim 
Jong-u told a seminar in Washington last April that per capita income feil from 
$1,000 in 1990 to $719 in 1995. This would give a total GNP of less than $17 
bilion, even tinier than the figure usualy cited in Seoul. More recently, foreign 
minister Kim Yong-nam apparently told a German TV Station that the economy was 
at risk of colapse, and blamed two years of floods plus the colapse of socialist 
markets.
While both these factors were indeed body-blows, what this omits is that the 
northem economy was already grinding to a halt amid multiple botlenecks. That
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planned economies must foul up in the end is surely a law of social Science by now, 
briliantly theorized by Janos Komai in The Socialist System. North Korea’s gravest 
economic weakness is its perverse refusal to concede, in the teeth of overwhelming 
evidence, the need for systematic economic reform. Even Kim Jong-u is at pains to 
emphasize that Chinese-style change is not on the agenda. Yet Pyongyang could at 
least take its cue from Cuba, where cautious moves to permit private enterprise have 
checked the post-Soviet slide such that growth of about 5% is expected for 1996.
Wil North Korea folow suit? Last year brought rumors of moves towards de 
facto contract farming in some areas. If true, this is good news - but it is not enough. 
Reform has to be publicly endorsed by the leadership, as in China; or eise would-be 
entrepreneurs can never be sure that the wind wil not change again, branding them 
as exploiters. Besides, in North Korea’s specific conditions - already industrialized 
to a degree, and with agriculture already intensive - it is not clear that rural reform 
alone could have the dynamizing efects on the economy seen in China and Vietnam.
A more promising course might be to expand export-oriented manufacturing. 
This was indeed one of the three priority areas (along with farming and consumer 
goods) in the very vague adjustment period of the past three years, folowing the 
admited but unquantified failure of the 1987-93 seven year plan. Nothing has been 
said about a plan for 1997 and beyond, adding to the sense of drift; one suspects that 
planning has in efect broken down. On the ground, export-oriented manufacture has 
been pioneered by Chongryun for over a decade with some success, e.g. seling 
men’s suits in Japan. South Korean firms have been geting involved, mainly in 
processing-on-commission (POC) so far, although Daewoo now has a factory at 
Nampo. And there is Rajin-Sonbong, although litle of the $350 milion in 
investment alegedly pledged there to date appears to be for export manufacturing as 
originaly envisaged.
With its cheap, educated and disciplined labor force, North Korea certainly has 
potential. But there are problems. Politicaly, both Korean govemments have held 
back. Seoul blew hot and cold on leting southem Companies invest in the north even 
before the submarine incident froze al such contacts, while Pyongyang too has been 
reluctant to give them a free hand. Economicaly, such development would at best 
create a few export enclaves: beter than nothing, but no substitute for the huge and 
costly task of modemizing the north’s core industries and its decrepit infrastructure.
Meanwhile, North Korea’s true priorities stil lie, depressingly, with the Second 
Economic Commitee in Kangdong, east of Pyongyang. The military economy gets 
the lion’s share of diminishing resources, while civilian factories lie idle and people 
go hungry. Paradoxicaly, in al sectors eaming foreign exchange by any means has 
top priority, leading to such odd phenomena as North Korean foreign exchange 
dealers playing the London money markets (and then defecting), let alone oficial 
involvement in drug smuggling in Russia and passing forged dolars in Thailand. 
Such desperate ventures may raise some cash and hone entrepreneurial skils, but 
they do no more to solve the northem economy’s structural problems than for 
Pyongyang’s reputation.
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As a result, the two Korean economies, which twenty years ago were neck and 
neck on many indicators, have now become impossible to fit on the same chart. 1997 
wil see southem GDP 30 times greater than the north’s (circa $540 bilion to $18 
bilion), and trade perhaps 150 times larger (more than $300 bilion, to less than $2 
bilion). What this gap means for eventual unification is beyond the scope of this 
article. But in my view, the fact that an ever richer south wil be beter able to aford 
to bankrol the north is a plus.
3 Society
Much analysis of North Korea looks only at economy and polity, but this is 
incomplete. It is in the realm of society that Pyongyang’s fate wil ultimately be 
determined. So what kind of society now exists north of the DMZ? Despite deeply 
rooted stereotypes of a hermit kingdom populated by true believers, the real north is 
complex, contradictory, and rapidly changing. Its varied faces are seen in two very 
diferent homecomings at the end of last year, a few days apart. One was the 16- 
strong family of Kim Kyong-ho, who reached Seoul from Hoeryong. The other was 
Chong Kwang-son, the teenage KPA soldier who drifted south, stoutly resisted al 
blandishments to defect, and retumed through Panmunjom to a hero’s welcome.
Today’s North Korea contains both fed-up Kims and loyal Chongs. But you 
cannot eat loyalty. It seems certain that the number of defectors, hitherto remarkably 
smal, wil increase henceforth, perhaps dramaticaly. Granted, not many have Kim 
Kyong-ho’s motive (siblings in Seoul) and resources (a rieh father-in-law in New 
York and a mother-in-law in Yanbian). But since this year’s spring famine is bound 
to be even worse than last year’s, sheer hunger and desperation wil be a powerful 
incentive, particularly for those close to the Chinese border, to make a ran for it.
Most however wil perforce stay put, but they too are no longer what they were. 
Studies by the Research Instimte of National Unification in Seoul suggest, plausibly, 
that even before the trade and food colapse in the 1990s, increasing hardship from at 
least the mid- 1980s had begun to take its tol on the loyalty of many North Koreans - 
particularly as this fal in living Standards coincided with the rise of Kim Jong-il. 
This period saw the growth of bribery, crime (such as pilfering), and cynicism. Now, 
things have got so bad that the regime has to tolerate people doing whatever they can 
to find food and simply keep alive, since it can no longer deliver the goods (literaly) 
itself.
How does this afect society? Some argue that the rise of black markets is a 
stabilizing force, since it staves of complete economic colapse and rebelhon - for 
which people are in any case too busy seeking food, or too weak. This may be true 
for now, but in the longer term we are witnessing a cracial and, I believe, ireversible 
change in North Korean society. The regime has failed to deliver, and as presently 
constituted wil never recover its capacity to deliver again. Blaming it al on
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foreigners and the weather wil in the end fail to convince, as against the simple and 
ever more widely known fact that next door, in China and South Korea, there is food 
in plenty. This is how hearts and minds are lost, never to be regained. People feel 
betrayed.
4 Conclusion
For al these reasons I remain a colapsist; even though it is stil true, as I wrote 
(more cautiously) in 1992, that predicting either the precise timing or manner of 
colapse is impossible. John Deutch, who as outgoing head of the CIA had access to 
far more and beter data on North Korea than most of us, told the Senate inteligence 
commitee in December that change wil come in the next two or three years - which 
means my 2000 target may stil be on track. Such change, he added, wil take one of 
three forms: either war, or colapse, or peaceful reunification.
But al three routes, surely, lead to the same destination: one in which North 
Korea is no more. I freely concede that, writing five years ago, I underestimated the 
north’s capacity to cling on grimly for dear life. Yet failing to expire is not the same 
as geting cured - a prospect which recedes ever further, as the patient stil refuses 
either to admit that he is il or to take the necessary medicine. Then again, with Seoul 
vacilating between ofering transplant surgery and euthanasia, Pyongyang’s mistrust 
is perhaps understandable. But that would be another article.
